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1I. THERE IS A CIRCUIT CONFLICT RE-
GARDING WHETHER AIKENS APPLIES
AT SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The existence of the circuit conflict regarding
whether United States Postal Service Board of Gover-
nors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983), applies at sum-
mary judgment is widely recognized. "[A]t least three
circuits have applied Aikens in reviewing motions for
summary judgment." Wells v. Colorado Dept. of
Transportation, 325 F.3d 1205, 1228 (10th Cir. 2003)
(separate opinion of Hartz, J.). On the other hand, as
respondents themselves note, the Fourth, Fifth and
Tenth Circuits have refused to apply Aikens to sum-
mary judgment. Br.Opp. 17-20. Indeed, those three
circuits have expressly disagreed with the District of
Columbia Circuit decision in Brady v. Office of the
Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490 (D.C.Cir. 2000). Pet.
23-25. Seven district court opinions have recognized
this conflict. Pet. 25-26 n.16. Respondents’ effort to
dispute the existence of the circuit conflict is unper-
suasive.
(1) Respondents assert that the District of
Columbia Circuit applies the homing of Brady only
"sometimes" and "sporadically." Br.Opp. 23, 24. But
respondents do not identify any cases in which the
District of Columbia Circuit has disavowed or ques-
tioned the rule in Brady. That Circuit has repeatedly
applied Brady (Pet. 17-18), and did so in three addi-
tional cases in July of 2015.1
Respondents claim that "even [the District of
Columbia Circuit’s] own district courts recognize the
folly [of applying Aikens] at summary judgment."
Br.Opp. 23. To the contrary, district courts in that
circuit have applied Brady in a large number of cases;
in the last twelve months alone there were 26 more
such district court decisions. Reply App. 7a-9a. The
three district court cases on which resporLdents rely
merely hold that the rule in Brady - used to deter-
mine whether there is sufficient evidence of an un-
lawful motive - is of no relevance where an employer
defends a lawsuit by asserting that the action com-
plained of (regardless of its purpose) was not suffi-
ciently adverse to be actionable at all.2
Respondents suggest that Brady only "leans" in
favor of applying Aikens to summary judgment.
Br.Opp. 23. "The expansive far-reaching command
Petitioner seeks, that district courts ’need not - and
should not - decide whether the plaintiff actually
1 Allen v. Johnson, 795 F.3d 34, 49 (D.C.Cir. 2015); Coleman
v. District of Columbia, 794 F.3d 49, 68 (D.C.Cir. 2~15); Giles v.
Transit Employees Federal Credit Union, 794 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C.Cir.
2015).
2 Bright v. Copps, 828 F.Supp.2d 130, 147 n.19 (]).D.C. 2011)
(denial of a lateral transfer not an adverse action); Adesalu v.
Copps, 606 F.Supp.2d 97, 103-04 (D.D.C. 2009) (dismissing
promotion claim because there was no vacancy); Turner v.
Shinseki, 824 F.Supp.2d 99, 114-16 (D.D.C. 2011) (criticism of
job performance not an adverse action).
3made out a prima facie case under McDonnell Doug-
las’ is simply unsupportable under ... Brady." Br.Opp.
24 (emphasis in original). But the language to which
respondents object is actually a quotation from the
decision in Brady itself. Pet. 17 (quoting 520 F.3d at
494). This language in Brady that a court "need not
and should not" inquire into tl~e existence of a prima
facie case once an employer has articulated a reason
for its actions has been repeated by district court
decisions in the District of Columbia Circuit in more
than 180 cases.3 That circuit’s 2008 holding in Brady
is clear, emphatic, and deeply entrenched.
(2) Respondents assert that the Seventh Circuit
holds that courts must always decide whether there
was a prima facie case unless (1) the prima facie case
issue is "a close question" and "more difficult" than
the issue of pretext and (2) the court concludes that
there was no showing of pretext. Br.Opp. 21. But
respondents do not even attempt to explain the
repeated contrary holdings in Seventh Circuit cases
(quoted at Pet. 19-20) that a court need not decide
whether there was a prima facie case once the era-
ployer has articulated a justification for its actions.
Respondents base their account of the Seventh
Circuit standard on the 1996 decision in Grottkau v.
Sky Climber, Inc., 79 F.3d 70, 73 (7th Cir. 1996).
~ That list can be generated by searching among district
court decisions in the District of Columbia Circuit for the phrase
"need not and should not" and the term "Brady" appearing in
the same opinion.
4Br.Opp. 21. But Grottkau itself quoted the holding in
Aikens that "[w]here the defendant has done every-
thing that would be required of him if the plaintiff
had properly made out a prima facie case, whether
the plaintiff really did so is no longer rel[evant." 79
F.3d at 73. The Seventh Circuit standard is estab-
lished by the post-Grottkau decisions in Lindemann v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 141 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 1998), Smith
v. American Federation of State, County and Munici-
pal Employees, Illinois Council 31, 247 Fed.Appx.
804, 808 (7th Cir. 2007) (applying Lindernann), and
Isbell v. Allstate Ins. Co. 418 F.3d 788, 796 (7th Cir.
2005) (applying Lindemann). In the Sever~th Circuit
today, district courts treat Lindemann as e~tablishing
the controlling rule (Reply App. 6a), routinely skip
the prima facie case issue when the employer gives a
reason for its action, and will rule for the plaintiff
(without regard to the existence of a prima facie case)
where there is evidence of pretext. E.g., Nauman v.
Abbott Laboratories, 2008 WL 4773135 at "8o13
(N.D.Ill. July 10, 2008).
(3) Respondents’ account of the rule i~ the Sixth
Circuit simply ignores that circuit’s decision in
Wixson v. Dowagiac Nursing Home, 87 F.3d 164 (6th
Cir. 1996), quoted at page 19 of the petition, that
courts are to apply at summary judgment "the same
rules" established by Aikens for cases that go to trial.
"Aikens discussed the respective burden,s of the
parties and the task of the trial court where there is a
full-dress trial. Our task is to apply the same rules in
a case where there has been no trial because the
5district court granted summary judgment." 87 F.3d at
170.
Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651
(6th Cir. 2000), respondents insist, "found only that
the district court erred by ’improperly conflating the
distinct stages of the McDonnell Douglas inquiry.’"
Br.Opp. 20 (quoting Cline, 206 F.3d at 661) (emphasis
added). But respondents make no effort to explain
how this quoted portion of the decision can be de-
scribed as the "only" holding in Cline, in light of the
detailed separate holding (quoted at page 18 of the
petition) that Aikens applies to summary judgment.
See 206 F.3d at 661.
(4) Respondents assert that "the Eighth Circuit
requires an employee who claims discrimination in
the workplace to establish a prima facie case in
summary judgment proceedings." Br.Opp. 22. But
respondents fail to address the contrary four Eighth
Circuit cases - quoted in the petition - that expressly
apply Aikens at summary judgment and hold that a
court need not decide whether there was a prima
facie case once the employer has articulated a justifi-
cation for its actions. Pet.20-21.
The opinions on which respondents rely are
actually inconsistent with their assertion. Schaff-
hauser v. United Parcel Service, 794 F.3d 899, 904
(8th Cir. 2015), never decided whether there was a
prima facie case, but instead held that "because [the
defendant] articulates a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason, the burden shifts to [the plaintiff] to show
that the ’proffered justification is merely a pretext for
discrimination.’" (quoting Davis v. KARK-TC, Inc.,
421 F.3d 699, 681 (8th Cir. 2015)). Wagner v. Gallup,
Inc., 788 F.3d 877 (8th Cir. 2015), quotes the holdings
in two earlier Sixth Circuit cases that a showing of a
prima facie case is not necessary when a defendant
offers a reason for its action. 788 F.3d at 885-86
(quoting Riser v. Target Corp., 458 F.3d 817, 820-21
(8th Cir. 2006) and Stewart v. Independent School
Dist. No. 196, 481 F.3d 1034, 1043 (8th Cir. 2007)).
Young v. Builders Steel Co., 754 F.3d 573 (8th Cir.
2014), on which respondents also rely, holds that a
plaintiff can establish a prima facie case by showing
that an employer’s proffered justification was a
pretext for discrimination. "[P]retext can ... establish
the inference-of-discrimination element of the prima
facie case." 754 F.3d at 578.4 This rule assures that a
plaintiff with sufficient proof of pretext will not have
his or her claim dismissed for lack of a prima facie
4 The Eighth Circuit decision in Young is one ~f a series of
decisions in that circuit holding that proof of pretext can estab-
lish a prima facie case. Lake v. Yellow Transportation, Inc., 596
F.3d 871, 874 (Sth Cir. 2010); Doucette v. Morrison County,
Minn., 763 F.3d 978, 982 (8th Cir. 2014); Putnam v. Unity Health
System, 348 F.3d 732, 736 (8th Cir. 2003); Lewis v. Heartland
Inns of America, L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 1040 (8th Cir. 2010);
Young v. Warner-Jenkinson Company, Inc., 152 F.3d 1018, 1022
(8th Cir. 1998).
7case. The Fifth Circuit in the instant case expressly
rejected that rule.5
Respondents assert, in the alternative, that "[t]he
Eighth Circuit Court ... permits courts reviewing
motions for summary judgment to either bypass the
question of the prima facie case or presume its show-
ing has been made but only when the summary
judgment record otherwise establishes that an era-
ployee’s claim of pretext is insupportable under the
evidence." Br.Opp. 22 (citing Riser) (emphasis added).
But Riser actually made clear that the circumstance
in which a court may bypass the prima facie case
issue is when the employer has articulated a reason
for its action, not when (or "only when") the court has
found that reason to be non-pretextual. "’[W]here the
defendant has done everything that would be re-
quired of him if the plaintiff had properly made out a
prima facie case ... ’... we need not ... [decide] whether
Riser met his burden of establishing a prima face
case .... " Riser v. Target Corp., 458 F.3d 817, 820-21
(quoting Aikens). Respondents’ account of Eighth
Circuit law is belied by that circuit’s decision in Hilde
v. City of Eveleth, 777 F.3d 998, 1004-08 (8th Cir.
2015), which bypassed the prima facie case issue even
though the court found there was sufficient evidence
of pretext.
5 "Paske argues that he can establish the fourth element of
his prima facie claim by showing that Fitzgerald’s stated
reasons for firing him were pretextual. That is not the law." App.
14a n.8.
8II. THERE IS A CIRCUIT CONFLICT RE-
GARDING WHETHER A     PLAINTIFF
MUST SHOW THAT THE DEFENDANT
TREATED MORE FAVORABLY A NEARLY
IDENTICAL SIMILARLY        SITUATED
COMPARATOR
Respondents do not deny or even a,:ldress the
existence of a circuit split regarding whether a prima
facie case requires proof that the plaintiff was treated
less favorably than a nearly identical similarly situ-
ated worker outside the protected group at issue. Pet.
28-33. Respondents correctly describe the case law in
the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eleventh
Circuits imposing that requirement. Br.Opp. 31-34;
see Pet. 27-29. But, as the petition explains, that
requirement has been expressly rejected by decisions
in the First, Second, Third, Ninth, Tenth and District
of Columbia Circuits. Pet. 28-33. The brief in opposi-
tion simply does not mention any of these circuit
court decisions rejecting this requirement, and does
not dispute the existence of a circuit conflict on the
issue.
III. PETITIONER DID NOTWAIVE THE
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Respondents object that Paske did not ask the
district court or court of appeals to apply Aikens in
this case, and argue that he is thus precluded from
raising that issue here. But, given the well-
established state of the law in the Fifth Circuit,
9raising this argument below would have clearly been
futile.
In 2010 and 2012 the Fifth Circuit expressly
rejected the rule in Brady. Atterberry v. City of Lau-
rel, 410 Fed.Appx. 869, 871 n.1 (5th Cir. 2010);
Stallworth v. Singing River Health System, 469 F.3d
369, 372 (5th Cir. 2012). In 2014 the Fifth Circuit
expressly refused to apply Aikens at summary judg-
ment. Hague v. University of Texas Health Science
Center at San Antonio, 650 Fed.Appx. 328, 334-35
(5th Cir. 2014).
In addition, there are 19 officially reported
decisions in the Fifth Circuit which specifically hold
that in summary judgment cases a plaintiff must
establish a prima facie case in order to avoid dismis-
sal. Reply App. la-5a. The court of appeals opinion in
the instant case began its analysis with the explana-
tion that "[b]ecause Paske attempted to prove race
discrimination through circumstantial evidence, the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework
governs his claim," (App. 13a), quoting a reported
Fifth Circuit summary judgment opinion. App. 13a-
14a (quoting Lee v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 574 F.3d
253 (5th Cir. 2009)). The district court opinion rested
on that same reported Fifth Circuit summary judg-
ment decision. App. 45a-48a (quoting and citing Lee).
Although constrained by that controlling Fifth
Circuit precedent, Paske did attempt to persuade the
court of appeals to adopt the Eighth Circuit variant,
which treats proof of pretext as sufficient to support a
10
prima facie case; adoption of that rule would have
had the effect of assuring that proof of pretext would
prevent dismissal of a discrimination claim. But the
court of appeals below, in rejecting that argument,
explained with palpable exasperation that under
controlling Fifth Circuit precedent a prima facie case
can be established only by identifying a nearly identi-
cal similarly situated comparator, not by showing
pretext. App. 14a n.8. Respondents acknowledge
(indeed insist) that the requirement of a similarly
situated comparator is established by longstanding
Fifth Circuit precedent (Br.Opp. 31-33), and do not
suggest that Paske was obligated to ask the panel or
district court to disregard that controlling authority.
IV. THIS CASE IS AN EXCELLENT VEHICLE
FOR DECIDING THE QUESTIONS PRE-
SENTED
This case presents an excellent vehicle for decid-
ing the questions presented.
There is no dispute that the Fifth Circuit decided
both questions. As respondents correctly state, "[the
Fifth Circuit] requir[ed] Petitioner to satisfy a prima
facie case showing by identifying evidence of a simi-
larly situated employee who is not white that re-
ceived more favorable treatment .... " Br.Opp. 27.
This appeal presents a quintessential example of
a case in which it mattered that the courts below
decided only the prima facie case issue, and that
those courts emphatically did not decide if there was
11
evidence that the defendants’ explanations were only
a pretext for discrimination. Respondents proffer a
highly exculpatory account of the events giving rise to
this action, and insist that their account reveals no
evidence of discrimination (an issue which the courts
below, of course, never decided). But a comparison of
the Statement in the Brief in Opposition and the
Statement in the Petition makes palpably clear that
the witnesses to the underlying events testified to
sharply divergent accounts of what occurred. The
court of appeals itself noted the conflict among those
accounts. App. 7a & n.4.
Respondents acknowledge that the evidence
might support the conclusion that the defendants had
engaged in "a crusade to terminate" Paske. Br.Opp.
39. But even if there was such a crusade, respondents
insist, the animus behind it was only "personally
motivated," and was not related to race. Id. Respon-
dents thus concede that there may be evidence that
the city’s reasons for firing Paske were pretextual,
but maintain that at worst those reasons were only
pretexts to cover up some unexplained "personal[]"
grudge, not pretexts to hide racial discrimination. It
is difficult to understand, and respondents do not
explain, why a jury which discredited the testimony
of city officials and found pretext would have to con-
clude that the covert animus motivating those officials
was entirely personal and not at all racial.
Because the courts below ended their analysis
merely upon concluding there was no prima facie
case, neither court below ever decided whether there
12
was sufficient evidence of pretext. As the court of
appeals made emphatically clear, under Fifth Circuit
precedents, in the absence of a prima facie case
established by identifying a nearly identical similarly
situated comparator, it is literally irrelevant whether
a defendant’s explanation for its actions is a pretext,
even a series of bald-faced lies, to cover up racial
discrimination.
Respondents argue that there are other grounds
on which summary judgment might have been granted.~
But neither court below addressed those contentions,
and this Court would have no occasion to do so if
review were granted. Should the decision of the Fifth
6 Respondents contend that the decision of the administra-
tive law judge who resolved a state-law challenge to Paske’s
dismissal should be accorded res judicata effect. But state
agency findings cannot have such preclusive effect in a Title VII
action. University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 795-96
(1986). In this case, moreover, the administrative law judge
expressly did not rule on the subjective motiw.tion for the
dismissal. R. 1166, p. 8.
Respondents argue that the Chief’s decision to fire Paske
was upheld by the City Manager. But in such circu:mstances the
city would still be liable if the Chief himself acted with a discrim-
inatory purpose. Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 562 U.S. 4!11 (2011).
Respondents contend that, even if Paske e~tablished a
prima facie case, he could only demonstrate pretex~ by showing
that a nearly identical similarly situated non-black comparator
was treated more favorably. But respondents do not explain why
pretext could only be proven in that particular manner. Any
such limitation would itself present a circuit conflict. See Lewis
v. Heartland Inns of America, L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 1039 (8th
Cir. 2010).
13
Circuit be overturned here, respondents would be free
on remand to pursue any other properly preserved
contentions that the lower courts have not yet re-
solved.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, a writ of certiorari should
issue to review the judgment and opinion of the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Respectfully submitted,
ERIC SCHNAPPER
Counsel of Record
University of Washington
School of Law
P.O. Box 353020
Seattle, WA 98195
(206) 616-3167
schnapp@uw.edu
MARGARET A. HARRIS
BUTLER & HARRIS
1007 Heights Boulevard
Houston, TX 77008
(713) 526-5677
Counsel for Petitioner
BLANK PAGE
